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Note of Editor-in-Chief 
This is the first Special issue of the journal Culture e Studi del Sociale-CuSSoc. The idea behind the special 
issue comes from this consideration: around the world, individuals are facing a critical moment, the COVID-
19 pandemic and its consequences require some reflections on many topics, often forgotten by scholars. This 
is the reason why many Italian and foreign scholars have been invited to give their contribution. Further-
more, now more than ever, it is crucial to share knowledge coming from multiple disciplines and that’s why 
it was decided to write an entire issue in English. 
For scientific and intellectual correctness, the contents of single articles refer to the situation as in mid-May 
2020. It is necessary to clarify that because this Special issue was published when many countries were start-
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After considering the reasons why pandemics are destined to remain also in the near future 
in our late industrial societies, a conceptual framework for the analysis of governance of 
resilience of health systems is described and then applied in details following its main four 
dimensions to the ways various health systems have coped with the pandemic of COVID-
19, with specific reference to the Italian National Health Service. In the conclusions, an 
overall assessment of the ways in which the health systems have responded to the pandemic 
of COVID-19 is traced on the basis of three different levels of resilience governance and 
their implications.  
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1. Back to the future: why societies will continue to cope with pandemics 
 
In recent decades, epidemiologists and medical historians have explained to us 
that what Omran (1971) called the ‘epidemiological transition’ - or the passage 
from the prevalence of infectious and acute pathologies that still characterized the 
era before to that of chronic-degenerative (oncological, cardiovascular) pathologies 
- had already been accomplished for late industrial societies, starting from about 
the middle of the last century. In reality, Omran identifies three phases of this sup-
posed long transition: the ‘age of the great plagues and hunger’, which from the 
Middle Age continues until the threshold of the modern era; the ‘age of declining 
epidemics’ that spanned the first two industrial revolutions during the nineteenth 
century until the two world wars; and, precisely, the ‘age of degenerative and man-
made diseases’, which would coincide with the contemporary era. Subsequently, 
two other epidemiologists (Olshansky and Ault, 1986) believed that, by virtue of 
the progressive decline in mortality rates due to chronic-degenerative diseases in 
late industrial countries, it was appropriate to introduce ‘the fourth stage of the epi-
demiological transition: the age of deferred degenerative diseases’. 
Only now, in the midst of current COVID-19 pandemic, do we realize that we 
have deluded ourselves with the belief that ‘the age of the great plagues’ was only 
a reminder of a more or less distant past: in reality, if we observe the historical 
trend of the great pandemics of plague, cholera, smallpox, typhus, TB, flu, etc. 
(Jones, 2020), we discover that they repeat cyclically due mostly to zoonotic virus-
es, that is, originating from an interspecies contagion from animals to humans. Not 
only that: the frequency and virulence with which pandemics occurred in the 
course of the twentieth century and to date appear significantly increased compared 
to past centuries, from the terrible ‘Spanish’ of 1918 with 100 million deaths to the 
‘Asian’ of 1957 which killed over a million people mainly in China, to the ‘Hong 
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Kong flu’ which in 1968-69 made more than 250 million infected with almost a 
million deaths worldwide, at H1N1, called ‘swine flu’, which in 2009 caused up to 
400,000 thousand deaths. 
That pandemics are therefore destined to remain also in the near future is con-
firmed by the new pandemic of COVID-19, which has occurred only a little over a 
decade from the previous one with such virulence that, as we write, it produced 
something like 4,962,707 cases of infection confirmed worldwide since the out-
break and 326,459 deaths (official figures, probably underestimated)1. Among the 
factors that can explain this persistence, those of environmental nature have been 
increasingly recognized as being among the most important ones. Epidemics and 
pandemics2 are an expression of environmental stress and an alteration of the bal-
ance between the human species and its living environment. Viruses and bacteria  
are part of the natural environment as well as mankind; in our organism at least 10 
million billions of foreign microorganisms coexist, which participated in our evolu-
tion, helping to shape our immune system; they are part of our genetic heritage and 
of our life of relationship with the outside world.  
Several studies have recently been published which have related the spread of 
coronavirus to exposure to air pollution and, in particular, to emissions of particu-
lates, or climate-altering gases (Setti et al., 2020; Xiao Wu et al. 2020). Every year, 
at the global level, the atmospheric particulate alone is responsible for about 7 mil-
lion deaths; in Italy the premature mortality attributable to particulate matter 
(PM2.5), ozone (O3) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) has been estimated at more than 
80,000 cases/year, without considering the effects of all the other pollutants (Euro-
pean Environment Agency, 2015).  
The causal link is also known between air pollution and many diseases that are 
the collateral cause of severity in Covid-19 (cardiac, vascular, respiratory diseases); 
the depressing action of the immune system and of normal development of respira-
tory function in children by air pollution (European Respiratory Society, 2010); the 
increase of risk of respiratory diseases and acute infections of the lower respiratory 
tract particularly in vulnerable individuals, such as the elderly and children. Anoth-
er feature of air pollution, and in particular of peaks in pollution levels, is the phe-
nomenon known as the ‘harvesting effect’: that of causing an increase in premature 
deaths of the elderly population and of other subgroups of the most vulnerable 
population as affected by one or more chronic diseases, the same population most 
affected by COVID-19 (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2016). 
Climate instability and, in particular, extreme climatic events (extreme heat and 
cold waves, floods, hurricanes, fires) can also have serious impacts in potentially 
more susceptible populations such as the elderly, causing mortality by cardiovascu-
lar, cerebrovascular and respiratory diseases, asthma and COPD, ischemic heart 
disease, arrhythmias, and arterial thrombosis (IPCC, 2013). Particularly, climate 
change affects the geographical spread of vectors (latitude and altitude), the seaso-
nality (risk periods) and the incidence of disease; they affect animal reservoirs of 
influenza viruses and bird migration patterns, spreading viruses to new locations 
and to a wider range of bird species (Wu et al., 2016). Greater opportunities for pa-
thogens to spread across the oceans arise also by the continuous melting of sea ice. 
Climate change can also cause or strengthen safety problems during all stages of 
                                                          
1 Source: WHO, Health Emergency Dashboard, May 22, 2020 (https://covid19.who.int/). 
2 The difference between epidemic and pandemic consists in the fact that the second has a greater 
degree of diffusion (intercontinental) and severity in terms of morbidity and mortality compared to 
the first. 
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food production and supply, such as microbiological contamination of food (myco-
toxins) or water. 
Air pollution and climate change are therefore the main causes of the persis-
tence of epidemics and pandemics and of their occurrence at increasingly frequent 
intervals: and they are both largely attributable to the action of man. Some other 
human activities that also cause air pollution and climate changes, such as intensive 
animal husbandry, have been identified as possible causes of the increased risk of 
mutations in pathogens and the spread of new epidemics. The concentration of 
many garments in small spaces and feeding with feed containing antibiotics favor a 
strong selective pressure on viruses and bacteria, which quickly change towards 
more aggressive strains and types also towards the human species, as it has hap-
pened with avian and swine flu. 
Deforestation is also among the activities with the greatest environmental im-
pact and at risk of favoring the spread of new viruses. With the shift of urban bor-
ders increasingly close to forests and the inevitable downsizing of the living space 
for wild animals, contact between them and the human species has been facilitated, 
which has always shared planet earth with wild animals but keeping the right dis-
tances. Without considering the habit of capturing and selling them in markets cha-
racterized by both promiscuity between several wild species and from crowding of 
humans. Finally, the urbanization models of the megalopolis that have concentrated 
millions of poor individuals in suburbs and in shanty houses without the minimum 
essential services together with the frantic movement of goods and people from one 
part of the planet to the other due to globalization, also favor the spread of epidem-
ics and pandemics. 
The fact that all the above phenomena are attributable to the action of man and 
his indiscriminate exploitation of the environment has led some natural scientists to 
qualify the contemporary geological era of history of the planet as ‘Anthropocene’ 
(Crutzen, 2002). Some social scientist think that this term is inadequate as a means 
of understanding the environmental changes to our planet in recent decade, sug-
gesting as a much more appropriate alternative ‘Capitalocene’, as the ‘age of capi-
talism’, and calling for a different conceptual framework which places global 
change in a new, ecologically oriented history of capitalism (Moore, 2016). What 
is certain in this debate, is the need to quickly change the industrial development 
model by a transition towards renewable energy sources, de-pollution of the territo-
ry, of the air and of the groundwater, and rebalance of the ecosystems: under penal-
ty of a future that is already present, reserving us new viral pandemics more serious 
than the coronavirus (hemorrhagic fever viruses), super-infections with bacteria re-
sistant to any drug treatment, or extreme weather events for which it will not be 
possible either to discover new drugs or develop new vaccines.  
 
 
2. A conceptual framework for health systems resilience governance  
 
Once we have outlined the general scenarios within which human societies – 
and, particularly, late industrial societies - are moving, we will now focus on the 
role of the health system in coping with them. In this respect, since 2014 at the time 
of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the international debate among health care 
systems researchers has been dominated by the concept of ‘resilience’. There is 
wide consensus that building or strengthening more resilient health care systems is 
an indispensable necessity if we want to face the above described scenarios. But 
the problem then becomes to define what resilience means, since it is just an um-
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brella term under which various scientific paradigms and policies can be accom-
modated. Since this term has often been used improperly and abused in various 
areas, it is first of all necessary to clarify what we mean by ‘resilience of a health 
system’. Drawing on the resilience literature, a group of British medical and social 
scientists of the Department of Global Health and Development of the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and of the Institute of Development Stu-
dies of Brighton has tried to clarify the meaning of this concept: 
 
Strengthening the capacity of health systems to manage resilience is critical to effective-
ly continue delivering essential preventative and curative healthcare services to popula-
tions. This requires adapting and transforming the structure and properties of the health 
system to move it away from undesirable risk situations.  However, how do we recog-
nize situations of risks? How do we know what properties of the system are better 
adapted to certain circumstances? What are the potential effects of alternative routes? 
Who makes decisions on the directions of the health system? (Blanchet et al., p.431). 
 
 To answer these critical questions about the management and governance of re-
silience on how to manage the capacities of health systems, the group of authorita-
tive scholars adopted a definition of resilience based on system thinking, environ-
mental studies and complexity theories:  
 
We see resilience of a health system as its capacity to absorb, adapt and transform when 
exposed to a shock such as a pandemic, natural disaster, armed conflict or a financial 
crisis and still retain the same control over its structure and functions (ibid.). 
 
The reference to the pandemic as one of the possible shock factors of a health 
system is particularly relevant to the current reality and makes the definition the 
researchers propose consequently quite significant for analyzing the methods of re-
sponse to this event and their concrete implications in terms of health policies. On 
the basis of the above definition, the group developed a new conceptual framework 
(fig.1, adapted from Lebel et al., 2006) of the dimensions of resilience governance 
of health systems ‘to help researchers dialogue with each other and generate more 
studies in this field’ (ibid.) 
According to this framework, the four dimensions interlinked with each other 
that characterize the governance of resilience of health systems are: 
 
• Knowledge: it refers to the capacity of health system and the mechanisms 
through which their actors collect, integrate and analyze different forms of 
knowledge and information, as well as the way this information feeds into com-
plex decision-making processes.  
• Uncertainties: the strategies health systems actors may adopt to anticipate and 
cope with uncertainties and unplanned events such as pandemics.  
• Interdependence: the capacity of health systems to manage interdependence 
with other systems and the environment, to engage effectively with and handle 
multiple and cross-scale dynamics and their feedbacks. 
• Legitimacy: the approaches through which health systems develop socially and 
contextually acceptable institutions and norms. 
 
This comprehensive framework integrate different approaches to resilience in 
health systems thinking into one single approach for use by researchers, practition-
ers and policy-makers. Below we will apply these four dimensions to the analysis 
of how the health systems have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in the inter-
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national context with specific reference to the Italian National Health Service, ul-
timately seeking to evaluate their outcomes in terms of levels of resilience. 
 
Fig. 1 – A conceptual framework of the dimensions of resilience governance 
 
 
Source: (Blanchet et al., 2017, p.432). 
 
 
3. First dimension: public health intelligence 
 
Being able to anticipate shocks and events like a pandemic requires a functional 
surveillance system capable of informing health service managers and policy mak-
ers in good time about the onset of the disease and the state of its spread. This 
should allow them to assess whether existing resources in terms of services, staff 
and equipment are able to intervene early enough to isolate the infection as soon as 
possible, or it is necessary to fill any gaps or weaknesses.  
Furthermore, decision-makers should be able to monitor risks and threats that 
may lie beyond the direct realm of the health system, involving other sectors (eco-
nomic, social, political, etc.). For this purpose, the nature of the knowledge that 
needs to be collected and processed needs to extend beyond the sphere of health 
systems: having access to such different types of knowledge implies the capacity to 
engage with different social actors belonging to different spheres of society. Social 
network analysis (Borgatti et al., 2009) has identified the role of ‘social brokers’ in 
this respect, referring to individuals in a health system who may help coordinate 
actors in time of crises or shock and build bridges between different groups within 
the system and beyond it.  
The general practitioner (GP), where it exists, is certainly one of such figures, 
being able to act as a gatekeeper between the people and the health care system, 
and as a go-between the hospital and the community health services in the territory. 
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His role is particularly significant in the initial phase of a pandemic, since it is in 
this phase of onset that precedes full recognition (Rosenberg, 1989) that its subse-
quent course is largely played out. In fact, at this stage, the population tends to ig-
nore or remove the signs that indicate that something strange is happening due to a 
desire for reinsurance or for economic interest, that only the acceleration of conta-
gion and mortality will force towards recognition. In this process, the role of the 
GP is crucial in identifying the sign of the outbreak and in motivating people to act 
accordingly. Moreover, he can involve social workers, volunteers, pharmacists and 
other people in enhancing public health ability to identify and respond to health 
events of potential pandemic proportion (Kahn et al., 2010). 
 The new emerging component of public health defined as ‘public health intelli-
gence’ (French and Mykhalovsky, 2013), consists in the detection (possibly even 
anticipated) of critical health events when they occur in order to disseminate the 
information needed to prepare for the emergency and raise public awareness of the 
preventive measures to be implemented. They are those ‘sentinel events’ which, if 
promptly identified, allow early detection of a pandemic in order to predict its 
possible progress.  
From this point of view, we can say that the Italian National Health Service 
(SSN) has shown itself to be very deficient overall, probably also due to its frag-
mentation at the regional level, since it has not been able to catch in advance the 
signs of the dangerous virulence of the new coronavirus. Although, in this, it was  
certainly in good company internationally, since we could quote the Darwinist 
statement such as ‘herd immunity’ of the British leader Johnson and the hundreds 
of thousands of deaths that he would have caused if he had been followed, destroy-
ing what little remains of the glorious British National Health Service; except a lit-
tle over two weeks later, now positive for the virus himself, to turn towards more 
restrictive measures by addressing a letter to British families with a peremptory ap-
peal: ‘You must stay at home’. 
Even Trump's twists and turns appear sadly unconscious, with constant head-to-
head compared to the indications previously given and hyperbolic oscillations be-
tween wicked underestimation and unusual rigidity, in a country like the USA that 
now boasts the unenviable record of having overtaken China, the United Kingdom 
and Italy in first place in the world ranking of coronavirus positives and deaths3; 
while the dire predictions of the immunologist Anthony Fauci, who has led the Na-
tional Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases since 1984, that the pandemic 
could have reached between 100,000 and 200,000 deaths, with millions of people 
infected in a country without a system adequate public health have unfortunately 
proved to be well founded. 
Returning to the Italian case, what did not work specifically in this dimension 
was the network of regional and Local Health Authorities (ASL) epidemiological 
observatories, whose staff was often cut or sometimes even canceled, reducing 
them to mere bureaucratic bodies; as well as the Public Hygiene Services, often 
deprived of their ability to collect data and information useful for guiding conse-
quent and timely actions. To this we can add that the National Center of Epidemi-
ology, Surveillance and Health Promotion (CNESPS), established in 2003 at the 
time of the avian and swine flu pandemics, was closed in 2016, victim of the cuts 
of the austerity policy following the post-crisis economic and financial situation of 
2008. 
                                                          
3 1,547,973 cases of infection and 92,923 deaths (source: WHO, Health Emergency Dash-
board, May 23, 2020). 
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4. Second dimension: coping with uncertainties 
 
Even when managers and political decision-makers have adequate and relevant 
information at their disposal, the decisions to be taken regarding the most appropri-
ate strategy to be adopted are still complex: and this essentially depends on the un-
certainty and unpredictability regarding the spread of the infection. Here then, in 
the face of the limits of any technocratic rationality, considering the need to take 
preventive action as quickly as possible, the best strategy becomes to involve the 
actors and services most directly facing the pandemic process: territorial medicine 
and proximity, primary care. 
This is clearly possible only if one has an adequate network of territorial inte-
grated health services (social-health districts, health centres, dispensaries, etc.) and 
health and social professionals (general practitioner, pediatrician, family and com-
munity nurse, community midwife, social worker, social-health worker, communi-
ty pharmacist, etc.) able to act as a two-way communication channel between the 
health system and the population: detecting critical events promptly and conse-
quently disseminating the necessary information. This network also becomes es-
sential to have primary health care services capable of filtering any emergency 
hospitalizations appropriately when really necessary, without overloading unneces-
sarily secondary hospital care. 
The difference between what happened in Italy in different regions is paradig-
matic from this point of view. In Lombardy Region, all the territorial community 
health and socio-health services, from nursing to rehabilitation, have been out-
sourced and privatized. Family medicine has been partly protected by the national 
category contract, and Lombard citizens were able to continue to choose their GP. 
However, the organizational structure of the territory was weakened considerably 
and there have been repeated attempts over the years to make it more precarious 
and inefficient. In 2011 the Lombardy Region established the Chronic Related 
Groups (CReGs), a project whose declared objective was to improve the living 
conditions of citizens suffering from chronic diseases; in reality, the undeclared 
one of reducing the role of GPs in the general management of chronic patients: 
opening it to any other type of provider, in particular private providers able to 
manage complex care paths remunerated through a flat-rate budgeting system simi-
lar to hospital Diagnosis Related Groups, DRGs (Maciocco, 2020).  
The project failed, but the Lombardy Region tried again a few years later with a 
new project entitled ‘Taking charge of the chronic patient’, always based on the 
idea of replacing the family doctor (GP) with private providers and complete the 
original primary care network annihilation project. But the project once again 
failed for two main reasons: private providers showed no desire to take on the as-
sistance of chronic patients poorly paid and poorly qualified for centers of excel-
lence such as theirs; and chronic patients themselves, who have the choice of indi-
cating the provider to trust, refused to bring their disease to the market and decide 
not to choose. In the meantime, the most fragile elderly and chronic patients with-
out adequate community care flocked to private nursing homes, the Residenze Sa-
nitarie Assistenziali (RSA), of which Lombardy has the Italian record for number 
of structures and beds: and it is right there that most of the over 15,000 Lombard 
deaths caused by the pandemic from Covid-19 occurred, a figure certainly underes-
timated, as shown by data of the joint report by the National Institute of Statistics 
and the High Institute of Health (ISTAT & ISS, 2020). 
It is in this way that  the network of General Practitioners and of social-health 
districts, crucial in intercepting a patient at the onset of symptoms and avoiding 
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that degenerates, has been dismantled over the years in Lombardy. Moreover, with 
the 2015 regional reform that transformed the Local Health Authorities (ASL) into 
ATS (Health Protection Agencies) - bureaucratic bodies with mere administrative 
control of the activities of the hospitals, poorly equipped and skilled in public 
health - the mortification of the fundamental role of gatekeeper of the general prac-
titioner and the privatization of most of the territorial socio-health services, as well 
as of the hospitals, was completed. 
Things have gone quite differently in other Italian regions with much lower in-
fected cases and mortality rates such as Veneto, Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, 
where territorial medicine has instead maintained a fundamental role in both pre-
vention and primary care, and the organization of the health care is based on the 
principles of a comprehensive primary health care with multidisciplinary primary 
care teams strongly linked with a specific territory and with the community. A fun-
damental role has been played here by the USCA (Special Units of Continuity of 
Assistance) in guaranteeing an early management of the infected and their care at 
home; as well as adequate coordination between the territory and the hospital that 
would allow avoiding the fragmentation of services and the overload of hospitals 
due to improper or late hospitalizations in intensive care; which is what happened 
instead in Lombardy, producing the clogging of intensive care and the wicked 
choice to build useless (temporary?) hospital structures which were then largely 
unused. 
Something similar to what has happened in Lombardy is currently replicated in 
USA, not casually the reference model of Lombard healthcare: even due to the ab-
sence of an appropriate public health network,  initially president Trump heavily 
underestimated the risks of spreading the epidemic, opting for a natural diffusion 
policy also under the pressure of the economic lobbies strongly concerned about 
the consequences on the economy that a lockdown could have produced. Then, 
when faced with the spread of the contagion and the growth of the dead, this choice 
appeared politically unpopular in view of the forthcoming elections, Trump de-
clared the national emergency very late only on March 13, when COVID-19 was 
widespread in 49 out of the 50 states. At that point, Vice President Mike Pence, 
official pandemic manager, said the government strategy would consist of a public-
private partnership with health insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies 
and private laboratories to make the diagnostic test available, otherwise not guaran-
teed by public facilities. That this was not enough, it is demonstrated by an Ameri-
can Medical Association statement complaining about the insufficiency of the di-
agnostic resources put in place and the protests of many doctors without protective 
devices, as well as the insufficient possibility of access to MEDICAID4 for the in-
fected poorer.  
 
 
5. Third dimension: the management of interdependence 
 
A health system is inextricably horizontally embedded within the other subsys-
tems of the society (political, economic, judiciary, social, cultural), and across 
scales at the different vertical levels of the supranational, state, regional and local 
institutional structures. All this implies the need for a governance of the dynamics 
of multiple inter-sector interdependencies and institutional multi-levels which is 
somewhat complex but necessary if one want to keep under control the different 
                                                          
4 The public insurance for the poorest people in USA, differently managed by each state.  
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factors and actors that influence the functioning of health systems as well as the 
health of citizens. This also implies recognizing that a pandemic is not only a 
health emergency problem, since its impact will involve all the above aspects in 
their complex interactions.  
The absence of a capacity to handle effectively multiple interdependence dy-
namics has been dramatically exemplified by the case of USA, where the clash be-
tween the logic of the economy in a neoliberal perspective of minimal state inter-
vention and that of the health emergency - which would have required a decisive 
public health intervention since the beginning of the pandemic - has appeared im-
mediately evident. Confirming the fact that it is once again the poorest and most 
marginalized people who pay the consequences of (non) political choices: while 
the probability of coronavirus infection of an African American was 5 times com-
pared to a WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon protestant), that of an Hispanic was 2 times. 
At the macro-level, the US economic growth trend has reversed, the number of un-
employed in the US has jumped to 36 million in a few weeks, leaping to 14.7% of 
the workforce, effectively deleting all the new jobs that were created after the 2008 
financial and economic crisis. If we consider that, in a health system like the US in 
which the private health insurance is based on the workplace, whereby losing the 
job also means losing health coverage, we understand what this means in the event 
of a pandemic. 
Moreover, the decentralized and plural nature of the US federal political system 
has not only prevented any adequate multilevel governance, but has triggered a 
strong institutional conflict between the White House and the states with democrat-
ic governors such as California, who have opted for much more rigorous lock-
down containment policies, criticizing the confused and contradictory messages 
that have followed one another from the federal government: and in response they 
have seen to foment armed revolts against the lockdown by white suprematist and 
neo-Nazi extremists supported by the White House. 
If we focus on the vertical multilevel governance in the Italian case, the clear 
disarticulation that the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted (if it was still needed) 
among the different institutional levels of the NHS immediately emerges; and, in 
particular, between the national and regional governments. The process of devolu-
tion from the central State to the Regions that followed the modification of Title V 
of the Constitution (l.cost. 3/2001), with the de facto transformation of the NHS 
into 21 Regional Health Services (SSR), in recent years has especially become an 
occasion for increasingly frequent conflicts and indeed open institutional clashes 
between the State and the Regions, especially in the context of the State-Regions 
board, which should have been the instrument of conciliation of divergences and 
compensation for inequalities that the so-called ‘federalism’ (in reality, an accen-
tuated regionalism) has inevitably produced. 
The trend toward an increasingly weaker role of the State compared to an ever 
stronger one of those Regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna) which, by 
virtue of the economic weight they represent, have come to claim the so-called 
‘differentiated autonomy’ - that is, the request for a further greater devolution by 
the State only to them, with the acquisition of exclusive power over various matters 
including health - has done nothing but throwing further fuel on the fire of the in-
stitutional clash now open between the stronger Regions (those of the Center-North 
with devolution), the weakest Regions (those of the Center-South and Islands, most 
of which, besides, under recovery plan by the State due to their mismanagement in 
the health sector) and Central State, sanctioning the de facto end of any effective 
unitary and universalistic national health service. 
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The ups and downs of claims and of blaming each other between the various in-
stitutional levels (Regions and State) that has occurred at the time of Covid-19 has 
thus patently made clear among public opinion what had so far emerged only in in-
stitutional settings as the true price to pay for all this: that is, a situation of increa-
singly clear differentiation and inequality of Italian citizens with respect to the pos-
sibility of access to treatment and to the same probability of survival (see impossi-
bility of access to intensive care). All this has begun to put on the agenda the need 
for an overall rethinking of the institutional architecture of the Italian National 
Health Service and its possible (partial?) re-centralization. 
 
 
6. Fourth dimension: building legitimacy between consensus and control 
 
The final important component of resilient health systems relates to the necessi-
ty of community trust, of building a trusting relationship with populations: ‘This 
can be built through an inclusive consultation process engaging communities mea-
ningfully as the users of the health system in the development of policies and man-
agement of healthcare services where patients are placed at the centre of the sys-
tem. … (This) requires trust and accountability to exist or be built at every level of 
the health system: from the patient, to the community health worker, the nurses at 
the health centre, to medical and managerial staff at higher level’ (Blanchet et al., 
2017, p.433). 
In the Asian cases, this problem of legitimacy has appeared less important. In 
China, the first country where the pandemic started on December 2019, the mono-
cratic structure of the Chinese one-party system reacted to the first signs of the oc-
currence of the coronavirus in two stages: first trying to deny the event by arresting 
the doctor who first identified it, covering up his diagnosis and the alarm, since it 
would have discredited local authorities in the eyes of the central government; 
then, when the spread was such as to no longer allow any cover-up, with the adop-
tion of draconian lockdown measures of the entire population of the city of Wuhan 
first, then of the surrounding province of Hubei and of major cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai, with the closure of all production activities, the limitation of public 
transport and non-essential commercial activities, and the carrying out of mass 
compulsory diagnostic screening. The Confucian cultural tradition, recently offi-
cially resumed in the last congress of the Chinese Communist Party and included in 
its political strategy with the idea of ‘social harmony’ and an ethics of virtues 
which includes respect for state authorities, has formed the dominant value back-
ground which has legitimized such restrictive political choices; however, rein-
forced by an efficient action of rigid social control implemented by the local police 
(night curfew and limited possibility of leaving the house) also with the aid of 
technological digital contact-tracing devices. The absence of riots, public demon-
strations or any other significant event of dissent seems to have confirmed the firm 
control by the government authorities of the social processes induced by the rigid 
containment strategy adopted. 
The same choice of a policy of strict containment of the pandemic was also ef-
fectively followed by other Asian countries, of which another most exemplary case 
is that of South Korea. Despite the significant difference in political and institu-
tional contexts compared to China - South Korea is a liberal democracy - it has 
adopted a rigid containment strategy very similar to the Chinese one, with two par-
ticularities. In addition to a more limited lockdown and a voluntary social distanc-
ing, mass driving diagnostic screenings were carried out for hundreds of thousands 
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of people in a few days, mandatory for groups considered at risk; and  geo-
localization by contact-tracing via mobile networks of the infected ones,  use of 
their credit card transaction data,  and the publication of their movements on blogs 
characterized this type of strategy in a hyper-technological sense. 
In the Italian case, the transition from a softer strategy of underestimating the 
pandemic problem to a more difficult (albeit fairly late) one of social containment, 
involving forms of ‘social distancing’ and domestic segregation of citizens, has 
clearly led to the need to legitimize at the media level these measures that seriously 
restricted privacy and personal freedoms in the name of security and collective 
health, against a public opinion traditionally reluctant to such forms of social con-
trol. It is therefore understandable that all this raised a serious problem both in 
terms of privacy and of more general social control, which is still open to various 
solutions, including the recruitment of volunteers to control the movements of 
people and dissuade any dangerous gatherings due to the non-respect of social dis-
tancing measures.  
A problem to which public health at international level has historically respond-
ed by oscillating between the two opposite polarities of the pre-eminence of indi-
vidual freedoms (neoliberal policies of the English-speaking countries) or of public 
constraint (authoritarian policies of surveillance capitalism in Asian countries). If 
in the first case we have witnessed the substantial impotence of the policies imple-
mented by the British and US governments based on the mere persuasion of citi-
zens, in the second case the policies banning all freedom of movement of the Chi-
nese government or the geo-localization ones through the traceability of mobile 
networks and other personal information from the South Korean government have 
certainly proven to be more effective.  
Therefore, is there no alternative to the opposition between ineffective freedom 
and authoritarian but effective constraint? That the risk is also, in the second case, 
of having public health reasons offered by the pandemic underway to implement 
forms of ‘authoritarian democracy’ such as that of Orbán in Hungary assuming full 
powers for an unlimited time with a special law, closing the parliament and gag-
ging the opposition, is an additional element that must make us reflect before mar-
rying the ‘Asian way’ as the only possible one: ‘The indefinite and uncontrolled 
state of emergency cannot guarantee respect for fundamental democratic rights’, 
sentenced the Council of Europe. 
How to avoid, then, that the sacrosanct measures from the point of view of pub-
lic health of ‘social distancing’ at the time of the pandemic of COVID-19 become 
the instrument to experience that ‘state of exception’ of which Agamben wrote 
(2003), meaning the suspension of the current constitutional order made by the 
same state authority which should normally guarantee the legality and its respect? 
Here it is a question of balancing two rights: the right to collective health and to the 
life itself of people on the one hand; and the civil rights of freedom, movement, 
expression and association on the other. 
The connective element between collective health and individual freedoms can 
be traced in considering solidarity the interface capable of combining and reconcil-
ing those two rights that are only apparently conflicting, but in reality both to be 
pursued even in exceptional emergency situations such as the pandemic . And what 
is solidarity if not the most complete expression of the founding principles that are 
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Conclusions: three levels of resilience 
 
At the end of this reflection, what conclusions can we then draw on the overall 
assessment of the ways in which the health systems have responded to the pandem-
ic of COVID-19? In the conceptual framework that we initially adopted (fig.1), 
three levels of increasing resilience are envisaged according to the response capaci-
ty of a healthcare system (Blanchet et al., 2017, p.432]: absorptive, adaptive and 
transformative. In the first case, the system limits itself to being able to neutralize 
the impact of the shock produced by the pandemic simply by trying to continue 
providing the same qualitative and quantitative level of care and people protection 
despite the shock by using the same resources and capacities. Since this often 
proves impracticable, the other two possible outcomes remain. 
In the case of adaptive resilience, the health system recognizes the need to prac-
tice some form of adaptive change (which could be both improving or worsening, 
depending on the point of view) that still allows it to survive with fewer and/or dif-
ferent resources, which requires making organizational adaptations without sub-
stantial changes. On the other hand, the case of transformative resilience entails a 
substantial structural and functional change of the system itself (also potentially 
improving or worsening, depending on the point of view adopted) to better adapt to 
the change that has taken place as a consequence of the shock. 
In the Italian case, an initial phase of absorptive type which tried to keep the 
functioning of the system unaltered by underestimating the pandemic problem has 
then been followed by a second adaptive phase which involved a significant reor-
ganization of the system. with the re-functionalization of hospital wards to 
COVID-19 wards, recruitment of new medical and health personnel, strengthening 
of intensive care. If, in the coming months, all this may also entail the further tran-
sition to a form of transformative resilience by virtue of an overall restructuring of 
the NHS (e.g., with a partial re-centralization), it is still too early to say. 
On the other hand, in the Asian case we have witnessed an effective transforma-
tive capacity of health systems such as the Chinese and South Korean ones, which 
have been able to change the structure and function of the health system to respond 
to the covid-19 shock. However, the function of these health systems has become 
predominantly of strict social control, not guaranteeing respect for individual civil 
rights and freedom.  
Finally, in the American case, the absorptive capacity of the healthcare system 
allowed it to continue operating as usual, without any substantial specific adaptive 
and even less transformative change. However, this has been achieved at the cost 
of maintaining and, indeed exasperating, the same profound iniquities on which 
this private system is based: the image of President Trump returning to play golf in 
his estate while the pandemic victims is now close to exceeding one hundred thou-
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